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FAMILY COURT OF NEW YORK
NASSAU COUNTY
In re S.S.1
(decided May 25, 2007)
S.S., a juvenile, was charged with acts, which, if he were an
adult, would constitute criminal mischief and attempted criminal
mischief in the second, third, and fourth degrees, and arson in the
fourth degree. 2  After calling four witnesses to testify at the fact-
finding hearing, the Presentment Agency rested its case and the
defendant moved to dismiss. 3 The Family Court of Nassau County
granted the motion and the charges were dismissed.4  The
Presentment Agency filed a motion to reargue, which presented the
family court with a case of first impression: whether a juvenile was
entitled to the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause under either
the United States Constitution5 or the New York Constitution,
6
"whe[n] a juvenile delinquency fact-finding hearing ha[d] been held,
and the petition ha[d] been dismissed at the conclusion of the
1 837 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Nassau County Fam. Ct. 2007).
2 In re S.S., 837 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
3 Id. at 865. The Presentment Agency is responsible for initiating and prosecuting a
juvenile delinquency proceeding.
4 Id.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. V, states, in pertinent part: "No person shall be... subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ...."
6 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6, states, in pertinent part: "No person shall be subject to be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense ......
1
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Presentment Agency's case."7  The court held jeopardy attached
when the defendant's charges were dismissed and denied the motion
accordingly. 8
The Presentment Agency moved to reargue pursuant to
section 2221 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR
Rule 2221"),9 arguing the evidence presented at the fact-finding
hearing was sufficient to uphold the charges against the defendant.'
°
The agency advanced three cases in support of its contention that
CPLR Rule 2221 was applicable in juvenile delinquency
proceedings." In addition, the agency "submitted a reply,
emphasizing that [its] motion [wa]s not for a 'retrial' and that if...
granted, the Presentment Agency would not be permitted to present
its case again, and would be precluded from offering any further
7 In re S.S., 837 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
8 Id. at 869.
9 Id. at 864. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2221 (McKinney 1999) which states, in pertinent part:
A motion for leave to... reargue a prior motion ... shall be made, on
notice, to the judge who signed the order .... A motion for leave to
reargue: shall be identified specifically as such; shall be based upon
matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked or misapprehended by the
court in determining the prior motion, but shall not include any matters
of fact not offered on the prior motion; and shall be made within thirty
days after service of a copy of the order ....
10 In re S.S., 837 N.Y.S.2d at 864. The fact-finding hearings were held on four separate
occasions, and a total of four witnesses were called to testify, two of which were detectives.
Id. at 865.
1 Id. at 866; Eveready Ins. Co. v. Farrell, 757 N.Y.S.2d 859 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2003)
("[a] motion for leave to reargue is addressed to the sound discretion of the court which
made the original determination and may be granted upon a showing that the court
overlooked or misapprehended the facts or law, or for some other reason mistakenly arrived
at its earlier determination."); Hoey-Kennedy v. Kennedy, 742 N.Y.S.2d 573 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't 2002) (indicating the motion to reargue was granted because the "Family Court did not
base its decision on new facts, but rather, found that the prior order . . . was based on a
misapprehension of the facts"); Long v. Long, 675 N.Y.S.2d 557 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1998)
(holding the motion for reargument was appropriate because the trial court "mistakenly
arrived at its earlier decision").
2
Touro Law Review, Vol. 24 [2008], No. 2, Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss2/11
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
evidence .... [T]herefore double jeopardy would not attach ....
The agency reasoned that if the dismissal was reversed, it would
merely lead to the continuation of the initial hearing, which would
not violate double jeopardy.
3
In response, S.S. argued CPLR Rule 2221 was procedurally
improper and inapplicable to the case at bar.' 4  The defendant
reasoned that an " 'order dismissing the petition . . . is only
appealable by a presentment agency to the Appellate Division as of
right if the dismissal was made before the commencement of the fact-
finding hearing.' ,15 Further, the defendant filed a sur-reply,
contending that if the motion to reargue was granted it would be in
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the federal and state
constitutions.'
6
The court rejected both parties' arguments regarding the
application of CPLR Rule 2221 to juvenile proceedings, dismissing
the Presentment Agency's supporting cases as inapplicable, and
because they merely reiterated the rule's conditions.17 Nor did the
family court find these cases resolve the double jeopardy issue as the
12 In re S.S., 837 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
13 Id. at 864.
14 Id. at 865 (The rule "does not apply to dispositional orders in juvenile delinquency
proceedings").
15 Id. at 867 (citing In re Leon H., 633 N.E.2d 1102 (N.Y. 1994)).
16 In re S.S., 865. See generally Held v. Kaufman, 694 N.E.2d 430 (N.Y. 1998) (stating
the court will consider arguments raised in a sur-reply even if the argument is not raised in
the initial reply).
17 "[A] motion for reargument is addressed to the sound discretion of the court which
decided the prior motion and may be granted upon a showing that the court overlooked or
misapprehended the facts or law or... mistakenly arrived at its earlier decision." In re S.S.,
837 N.Y.S.2d at 866-67.
2008]
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agency suggested.' 8  Likewise, the defendant was unsuccessful in
establishing that the rule was inapplicable.19 Notwithstanding the
applicability of CPLR Rule 2221, the court indicated the double
jeopardy issue still remained.2 °
The family court found that jeopardy attached upon dismissal
of the charges and any rehearing would violate the New York Family
Court Act section 303.221 and New York Criminal Procedure Law
sections 40.2022 and 40.30,23 the United States Constitution and the
New York Constitution. It was mentioned that if the Presentment
Agency moved to reargue "during the continuation of the fact-finding
hearing" then double jeopardy would not have been a concern.25
However, when the motion was filed, the case was no longer before
the court, and thus the motion was denied.26
The family court addressed the double jeopardy issue under
the Federal Constitution by referring to the United States Supreme
18 Id.
19 Id. at 867 ("Although [In re Leon H.] illustrates the Presentment Agency's right to
appeal in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, it does not show that CPLR Rule 2221 does not
apply to this case.").
20 Id. at 867.
21 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 303.2 (McKinney 1999) ("The provisions of article forty of the
criminal procedure law concerning double jeopardy shall apply to juvenile delinquency
proceedings.").
22 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 40.20 (McKinney 2006) states, in pertinent part: "A person
may not be twice prosecuted for the same offense."
23 N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 40.30 (McKinney 2006) states, in pertinent part: "[A] person
'is prosecuted' for an offense within the meaning of section 40.20, when he is charged... by
an accusatory instrument filed in a court of this state [and] ... : [I]n the case of a trial by the
court without a jury, a witness is sworn."
24 In re S.S., 837 N.Y.S.2d at 869. "Double jeopardy also bars post-acquittal fact-finding
Family Court proceedings, whether those proceedings be a second trial or the resumption of
a trial which has already been commenced." Id. at 868 (citing In re Jose R., 632 N.E.2d
1260, 1262 (N.Y. 1994)).
25 In re S.S., 837 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
26 Id.
4
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Court's decision in Green v. United States.27 In Green, an adult male
was found guilty of arson and murder in the second degree.2 8 The
defendant appealed the murder conviction and the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded for
further proceedings.29 On remand, Green was convicted of first
degree murder, which the jury was specifically unable to convict him
of during his first trial.30 Green appealed, arguing jeopardy attached
to his first trial when he was tried and that he was acquitted of murder
in the first degree. The circuit court affirmed the conviction and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.3'
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding Green's
constitutional rights afforded under the Fifth Amendment were
violated when he was put on trial twice for murder in the first
degree.32 The Court explained, "double jeopardy was designed to
protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and
possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense. 33
Further, the Double Jeopardy Clause operates to prevent an
individual from being subjected to "embarrassment, expense and
ordeal and compel[s] him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guilty. 34 The Court found the acquittal
27 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
28 Green, 355 U.S. at 186.
29 Id.
30 id.
31 Id. at 186.
32 Id. at 198.
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was a final determination which prevented the defendant from being
prosecuted a second time for the same offense, even though no
judgment was made. 35 When Green was initially put on trial, he was
convicted of murder in the second degree, but the jury was silent with
regard to the charge of murder in the first degree, and eventually
dismissed without rendering a verdict as to that charge.36 The Court
reasoned the jury's silence and subsequent dismissal constituted an
implied acquittal and accordingly that charge could not be retried.37
For that reason, Green's conviction was overturned.38
Similarly, in Smalis v. Pennsylvania,39 the Supreme Court
addressed whether the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded an appeal
when the trial court dismissed the charges at the conclusion of the
prosecution's case for "insufficient [evidence] to support a
conviction., 40 In Smalis, two adult landlords, a husband and wife,
were charged with criminal homicide, reckless endangerment, and
causing a catasrophe, when a building they owned burned down,
resulting in the deaths of two tenants. 4' After the prosecution rested
its case, the defendants filed a demurrer, which was granted.42 The
prosecution appealed, but the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
affirmed, finding the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded an appeal.43
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, holding a demurrer
" Id. at 188.
36 Id. at 190-91.
" Id. at 190.
38 Green, 355 U.S. at 198.
39 476 U.S. 140 (1986).
40 Smalis, 476 U.S. at 141.
41 id.
42 Id.
41 Id. at 142.
[Vol. 24
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was a ruling on the law, not on the facts, and thus may be appealed."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.45
The Supreme Court reversed the state supreme court's
decision, and agreed with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania that
when evidence is inadequate to support a conviction, the subsequent
dismissal constitutes an acquittal subject to the Double Jeopardy
Clause.46 The Court reasoned that "[w]hat the demurring defendant
[sought was] a ruling that as a matter of law the State's evidence
[was] insufficient to establish his factual guilt. 47 Thus, when the
demurrer was granted, it was the equivalent of an acquittal for double
jeopardy purposes and the commencement of a second trial or further
proceedings after an acquittal violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Accordingly, after the demurrer was granted, the prosecution's appeal
was barred.48
In Serfass v. United States,49 the United States Supreme Court
summarized the point at which jeopardy attached in a criminal
proceeding. "[J]eopardy does not attach ... until a defendant is put
to trial before the trier of facts, whether the trier be a jury or a
judge."5 ° When the trier was a jury, jeopardy attached as soon as the
jury was empaneled and sworn; when the trier was a judge, jeopardy
attached when the first evidence was introduced.5'
44 Id. at 143 (citing Commonwealth v. Zoller, 490 A.2d 394, 401 (1985)).
45 Smalis, 476 U.S. at 143.
46 Id. at 142.
41 Id. at 144.
48 Id. at 146.
49 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
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Moreover, in In re Gault,52 the United States Supreme Court
found the Due Process Clause requires that some procedural
requirements must be made available to juveniles in delinquency
proceedings because, were the juvenile an adult, he would be
guaranteed certain rights and protections. 3 However, the Court
concluded children should be distinguished from adults and should
not be subjected to the harsh retributive penalties for the wrongful
acts they commit; a greater emphasis should be placed on
rehabilitation. 4 The Court did not extend the application of jury
trials to juvenile proceedings as held in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
55
where the Court reasoned due process did entitle juveniles to a trial
by jury because it would not enhance the fact-finding process, nor
improve the court's efficiency. 6 However, it is at the discretion of
the juvenile court justice to use an advisory jury if necessary. 7
Further, in Breed v. Jones,58 the United States Supreme Court
held that jeopardy attached to juvenile delinquency proceedings. 9 In
Breed, a seventeen-year-old boy, considered a juvenile under
California law, was charged with acts equivalent to the adult charge
of armed robbery.60 After an adjudicatory hearing, the juvenile court
52 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
53 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 29.
14 Id. at 15-16. "On this basis, proceedings involving juveniles were described as 'civil'
not 'criminal' and therefore not subject to the requirements which restrict the state when it
seeks to deprive a person of his liberty." Id. at 17.
" 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
56 McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547.
7 Id. at 548.
s 421 U.S. 519(1975).
'9 Breed, 421 U.S. at 541.
60 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West 1966) (amended 1971) ("Any person who is
under the age of 18 years when he violates any law of this state... is within the jurisdiction
336 [Vol. 24
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accepted the petition's charges, and a dispositional hearing was
scheduled.6' At the dispositional hearing, the court declared the
"respondent unfit for treatment as a juvenile, and ordered that he be
prosecuted as an adult., 62 The juvenile court, the California Court of
Appeals, and the Supreme Court of California denied the defendant's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which raised a double jeopardy
defense.63 Ultimately, the juvenile was tried before the Superior
Court of California and convicted of robbery in the first degree.
64
Subsequently, the defendant's guardian ad litem filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, seeking to
reverse the defendant's second conviction for the same offense on the
grounds that jeopardy attached when the juvenile court sustained the
charges at the adjudicatory hearing.65 The district court rejected the
petition, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding
jeopardy attached to the adjudicatory hearing.66 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari.67
The Supreme Court held that when the juvenile was put on
trial in the Superior Court of California, his constitutional rights
under the Fifth Amendment were violated.68 The Court rejected the
arguments that the Double Jeopardy Clause was not violated because
a final decision was not rendered when the case was transferred to the
of the juvenile court...."); Breed, 421 U.S. at 521.
61 Breed, 421 U.S. at 521.
62 Id. at 524.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 525.
65 Id.
66 Breed, 421 U.S. at 526.
67 Id. at 527.
68 Id. at 541.
2008]
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Superior Court of California, and that precluding such transfers after
the commencement of an adjudicatory hearing would negatively
affect the juvenile-court system.69  Further, the juvenile's
constitutional rights should not be deprived because "the proceedings
.. had not run their full course ... at the time of transfer.,
70
In addition, the Court recommended that if a transfer was
sought, a hearing on that decision should be conducted "prior to the
adjudicatory hearing," which the Court deemed to be a manageable
and even beneficial alternative.7 1 The Court reasoned that, "in terms
of potential consequences, there is little to distinguish an adjudicatory
hearing ... from a traditional criminal prosecution. For that reason,
it engenders elements of anxiety and insecurity in a juvenile, and
imposes a heavy personal strain. ' '7 2  The Court found jeopardy
attached when evidence was presented to the trier of the facts.73
Accordingly, jeopardy attached to the adjudicatory hearing in the
juvenile court, and the Fifth Amendment barred any further
proceedings.
In addition to the state constitutional double jeopardy
provision, New York provides expanded protections by statute. 74 The
69 Id. at 532 ("[I]t would diminish the flexibility and informality of juvenile court
proceedings without conferring any additional due process benefits upon juveniles charged
with delinquent acts." (internal quotations omitted)).
7 Id. at 534.
71 Breed, 421 U.S. at 536. The Court stated that when a transfer is considered and
rejected, any burden placed on the juvenile court can be alleviated by substituting judges.
Also, there was no indication that the juvenile court system lacked sufficient resources. Id.
at 537-38. "Knowledge of the risk of transfer after an adjudicatory hearing can only
undermine the potential for informality and cooperation which was intended to be the
hallmark of the juvenile-court system." Id. at 540.
72 Id. at 530 (citation omitted).
13 Id. at 531.
74 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 303.2 (McKinney 1999) ("The provisions of article forty of the
[Vol. 24
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state's double jeopardy standards are set forth in its criminal
procedure law.75 The New York Family Court Act also expressly
provides that the double jeopardy provisions codified in the New
York Criminal Procedure Law are applicable to juvenile delinquency
proceedings.76
The family court in In re S.S. was persuaded by a decision
issued by the Family Court of Kings County in Malik 0.,77 which did
not present a double jeopardy argument, but raised double jeopardy
concerns in its analysis. The decision was relevant because it
involved a motion to reargue stemming from a juvenile proceeding.
In In re Malik 0., the family court addressed whether it was
permitted to unseal the records of a dismissed juvenile delinquency
proceeding when considering the Presentment Agency's motion to
reargue.78
In Malik 0., the respondents were charged with acts
equivalent to the adult charges of criminal possession of stolen
property in the fifth degree and petit larceny. 79 After the complainant
failed to appear at the fact-finding hearing, the respondents moved
for a dismissal. The motion was granted and the records were
sealed. 80 "The presentment agency... move[d] by means of Order to
criminal procedure law concerning double jeopardy shall apply to juvenile delinquency
proceedings."); In re Richard S., 761 N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Queens County
2003).
75 See supra notes 22-23. See also In re Richard S., 761 N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (Queens
County Fam. Ct. 2003).
76 In re Richard S., 761 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
77 598 N.Y.S.2d 688 (Nassau County Fain. Ct. 1993).
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Show Cause to have the records unsealed to allow the court to hear
reargument pursuant to CPLR § 2221 on whether the court should
vacate its dismissal orders and amend the petitions."8' The
Presentment Agency argued the dismissal should be vacated because
the complainant was absent as a result of a scheduling mistake, which
was a sufficient reason to adjourn the proceeding. 82 In response, the
respondents argued the reason advanced by the agency was "not a
basis for a good cause adjournment," and that the motion to reargue
was inapplicable to juvenile delinquency proceedings.83
The Presentment Agency's motion was denied "[d]ue to the
quasi-criminal nature of juvenile delinquency proceedings and the
importance of the right to a speedy trial, [which made] a motion to
vacate sealed orders of dismissal inappropriate., 84 New York Family
Court Act section 16585 granted the family court judge complete
discretion to determine whether CPLR should apply to juvenile
delinquency proceedings. 86  The court was unable to discover any
authority to suggest that CPLR Rule 2221 was applicable in a
juvenile delinquency proceeding for the purposes of vacating a
dismissal.87
81 Id. at 689.
82 Id.
83 In re Malik 0., 598 N.Y.S.2d at 689.
84 Id. at 693.
85 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 165 (McKinney 1999) states, in pertinent part: "[W]here the
method of procedure in any proceeding in which the family court has jurisdiction is not
prescribed... the provisions of the civil practice law and rules shall apply to the extent they
are appropriate to the proceedings involved."
86 In re Malik 0., 598 N.Y.S.2d at 691. "The wide latitude courts claim in determining
the applicability of the CPLR is circumscribed by at least two major considerations: (1)
substantial rights and due process of law, and (2) equal protection of law." Id. at 692.
87 Id. at 692.
340 [Vol. 24
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An order issued in a juvenile proceeding may be vacated in a
number of ways, but the Presentment Agency failed to establish a
basis for any of them.88 First, pursuant to New York Family Court
Act section 355.1,89 an order of dismissal may be vacated. It was the
legislature's intent, however, to bar the presentment agency from
using this remedy, because it could prompt double jeopardy
concerns. 90 Second, a court, "in the interests of justice," may vacate
an order of dismissal, but this method does not pertain to dismissed
cases that are "no longer before the court." 91 Third, the court may
vacate a dismissal if the motion to reargue was made "in the context
of a continued proceeding., 92  The New York Court of Appeals
highlighted the third procedure in In re Lionel F.,9 when it held the
Double Jeopardy Clause was not violated when the Family Court of
Queens County vacated its earlier dismissal at a fact-finding hearing
and continued with further proceedings.94
In re Lionel F. concerned a juvenile who was charged with
five delinquent acts, which would have constituted criminal
violations had he been an adult.95 At the fact-finding hearing, the
defendant entered a motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the
88 Id.
89 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 355.1 (McKinney 1999) states, in pertinent part:
Upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances, the court may
on its own motion or on motion of the respondent or his parent or person
responsible for his care: grant a new fact-finding hearing or dispositional
hearing; or stay execution of, set aside, modify, terminate or vacate any
order issued in the course of a proceeding under this article.
90 In re Malik 0., 598 N.Y.S.2d at 692.
9' Id. at 693.
92 Id.
" 558 N.E.2d 30 (N.Y. 1990).
94 In re Lionel F., 558 N.E.2d at 31.
9' Id. at 30.
2008]
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Presentment Agency's case. The family court dismissed four of the
five counts, but after reserving its decision on the fifth count, the
court denied its dismissal and vacated the dismissal of the other four.
A few weeks later, the case proceeded and the defendant was found
guilty on three counts in the original indictment after failing to call a
witness.9 6 The appellate division held the Double Jeopardy Clause
was not violated when the family court vacated its dismissal of four
of the charges.9 v The New York Court of Appeals affirmed.9 s
The New York Court of Appeals found that "at the time the
court vacated its earlier ruling, the proceeding was still pending
before it," because the fifth count was still under consideration.99
Therefore, since the proceeding was still pending, and no further
evidence was advanced by the Presentment Agency after the
dismissal was vacated, the court reasoned that under the terms of the
Double Jeopardy Clause, the juvenile was not put in jeopardy twice,
but rather his initial proceeding merely continued.'00 Accordingly,
the conviction was upheld.1 1
Conversely, in In re Frank K, °2 the Appellate Division,
Fourth Department, held that a juvenile "was placed in jeopardy
twice when the fact-finding hearing was reopened to receive ...





99 In re Lionel F., 558 N.E.2d at 31.
1oo Id.
10' Id. at 30.
102 450 N.Y.S.2d 129 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1982).
103 In reFrankK., 450 N.Y.S.2d at 130.
[Vol. 24
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At the conclusion of the prosecution's case, the juvenile defendant
argued the charges brought against him were not supported by legally
sufficient evidence and he moved to dismiss. 104 The motion was
granted, however, the case was reopened after the prosecution
presented the family court with new probative evidence.
Subsequently, the family court deemed the defendant to be a juvenile
delinquent. 105
On appeal, the appellate division held a juvenile proceeding
may not be reopened to hear additional evidence after the case
concluded in favor of the defendant. 10 6 At the initial hearing the
defendant moved pursuant to New York Family Court Act section
751,107 suggesting the prosecution did not advance sufficient
evidence in support of its proposition that the juvenile was a
delinquent. 08 The family court rendered a decision in favor of the
juvenile based upon the merits of the claim and therefore when the
defendant's motion was granted the case was no longer before the
court. 0 9 Accordingly, the prosecution was barred from reopening the
fact-finding hearing.'
10
Similarly, in Fonseca v. Judges of Family Court,"' the
Supreme Court of Kings County held the Double Jeopardy Clause
applies to juvenile delinquency proceedings pursuant to the Due
.104 Id. at 129.
105 Id.
"' Id. at 130.
107 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 751 (McKinney 1999) states, in pertinent part: "If the allegations
of a petition under this article are not established, the court shall dismiss the petition."
'o' In re Frank K., 450 N.Y.S.2d at 130.
109 Id.
110 Id.
... 299 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Kings County Sup. Ct. 1969).
2008]
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Process Clause." 12 In Fonseca, a juvenile was charged with an act
equivalent to the crime of unauthorized use of a vehicle. 3 At the
fact-finding hearing, the prosecution was unprepared to proceed with
its case, after the arresting police officer testified that he did not
observe the juvenile inside the vehicle.1 4 A mistrial was declared,
but the juvenile objected, and the prosecution continued questioning
the police officer before finally admitting it was unprepared." 5 The
prosecution stated it had an identification witness, although the
witness was not present. In response, the court granted the
prosecution an adjournment, but also declared a mistrial.'
1 6
Subsequently, the juvenile filed a petition to prevent the prosecution
from commencing another fact-finding hearing.' The petition was
granted due to double jeopardy concerns. 118
A distinction was drawn between the rules of attachment in
the federal courts and those in the state courts, whether before a jury
or a judge. The court declared:
It is the law of this State that a person is in legal
jeopardy when he is put upon trial before a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon an indictment or
information which is sufficient in form and substance
to sustain a conviction, when a jury has been
impaneled and when some evidence is taken....
.... The federal rule is that a defendant is subjected
112 Fonseca, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 498.
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to jeopardy after a jury has been selected and sworn
but... [the New York State courts] require[] not only
that the jury be sworn but that evidence be taken.119
As for bench trials, New York followed a similar approach as
the federal courts by subjecting a defendant to jeopardy when
evidence is heard. 20  Accordingly, the court determined that the
defense of double jeopardy must be upheld. 12' The court reasoned
jeopardy attached following the officer's testimony of the details of
the arrest. 22 Further, there was insufficient evidence to convict the
juvenile and the prosecution's late discovery of an absent key witness
was not enough to declare a mistrial.
123
Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Breed,
where the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment were afforded to juveniles in adjudicatory hearings, the
underlying issue has become the period at which jeopardy attaches.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
states to honor the Double Jeopardy Clause. However, the states may
choose to expand its afforded protections. New York expands the
protections constitutionally, but by also statutorily, through
provisions in the New York Family Court Act and in the New York
Criminal Procedure Law.1
24
..9 Id. at 495-96 (citations omitted). See also Smith v. Marrus, 826 N.Y.S.2d 263, 264
(App. Div. 2d Dep't 2006) ("In a jury trial, once the jury is empaneled and sworn, jeopardy
attaches.").
120 Fonseca, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
121 Id. at 498.
122 Id. at 496.
123 Id. at 498.
124 In re S.S., 837 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
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The federal courts have adhered to the rule that jeopardy
attaches to a jury trial as soon as the selected jury takes an oath, and
to a bench trial when evidence is heard. 125 On the other hand, states
have differed on when jeopardy attaches in state court proceedings,
especially because a jury trial is not a guarantee in a juvenile
proceeding. 126 For example, New York adheres to the federal rule for
bench trials, but for jury trials, not only must the jury be "selected
and sworn," but evidence must also be heard for jeopardy to attach.1
27
By contrast, in Texas, "the constitutional guarantee that jeopardy
attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn ... applies equally to
a juvenile proceeding."'' 28 On the other hand, in California, "jeopardy
does not attach until the first witness has been sworn.' 129 Therefore,
depending on the state, jeopardy attaches at different points in time
during an adjudicatory proceeding.
New York protects juveniles charged with quasi-criminal acts
to a greater degree than that afforded under the Federal Constitution
and the New York State Constitution by virtue of statutory
protections. 130 Accordingly, a juvenile's right to be shielded, under
these statutory protections, from multiple prosecutions for the same
offense remains intact in New York. In fact, juveniles facing
multiple state prosecutions may receive an even greater degree of
protection in the future, depending on the preference of the New
125 Fonseca, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
126 See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547.
127 Fonseca, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
121 State v. C.J.F., 183 S.W.3d 841, 848 (Tex. App. 2005).
129 Richard M. v. Superior Court, 482 P.2d 664, 668 (Cal. 1971).
130 In re S.S., 837 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
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RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
United States Constitution Amendment VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed ....
New York Constitution article I, section 1:
No member of this state shall be . . . deprived of any rights or
privileges secured to any citizen thereof unless by ... the judgment
of his or her peers ....
New York Constitution article I, section 2:
Trial by jury. . . shall remain inviolate forever .... A jury trial may
be waived by the defendant in all criminal cases, except those in
which the crime charged may be punishable by death, by a written
instrument signed by the defendant in person in open court before
and with the approval of a judge or justice of a court having
jurisdiction to try the offense. The legislature may enact laws, not
inconsistent herewith, governing the form, content, manner and time
ofpresentation of the instrument effectuating such waiver.
New York Constitution article VI, section 18:
[A] jury shall be composed of six or of twelve persons and may
authorize any court which shall have jurisdiction over crimes and
other violations of law, other than crimes prosecuted by indictment,
to try such matters without a jury, provided, however, that crimes
prosecuted by indictment shall be tried by a jury composed of twelve
persons, unless a jury trial has been waived as provided in section
two of article one of this constitution.
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